Ixtoc I: A Test for the Emerging
Concept of the Patrimonial Sea*

ALAN T. LEONHARD**

The Ixtoc I blowout of June 1, 1979 raised many issues concerning the status of the concept of the 'patrimonial sea." This article
examines the emergence of this conceptfrom the perspective of
Latin American jurists who adhere to the tradition of regional
particularismin internationallaw; and considers the question as
to whether or not the 'patrimonial sea" is lex lata or lex ferenda.
The realities of the development of new laws of the sea at the internationaland regional levels shattered the ideas that the vastness of the oceans would prevent serious pollution and that the
wealth of the seabed is a "common heritage of mankind." Some
conclusions are made concerning liabilityfor oil spillsfrom offshore drilling operations and obstacles to the enactment of domestic, regionaland internationalrules aimed at avoidingfuture
disasters like Ixtoc .

INTRODUCTION

On June 3, 1979, when gas and oil from a damaged wildcat offshore well surfaced and caught fire, sending 30,000 barrels of
crude oil per day gushing into the Bay of Campeche, petroleum
troubleshooters had a difficult time speculating about the potential magnitude of the disaster. Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) immediately played down the seriousness of the catastrophe and
continued to stave off domestic and international criticism
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through its Director General, Jorge Diaz Serrano.' Although a
team of 500 experts from eight countries under the direction of
Paul "Red" Adair successfully capped the well, it blew out again
on June 24, causing the famous firefighter to abandon the project.
Pemex officials hope either to close off the well's valves with the
aid of divers or to bring the spill under control by drilling two relief wells several hundred meters away from the site of the blowout. The crisis is clearly destined to become the largest oil spill in
the history of the petroleum industry as the volume of crude that
spewed into the Bay of Campeche and drifted into the Gulf of
Mexico exceeded the record spill from the Amoco Cadiz off the
French coast in 1978.
The circumstances surrounding the massive spill are fraught
with polemics emanating from environmentalist and political critics. 2 This paper, however, attempts to answer some questions
that might be posed by students of international law concerning:
(1) the degree to which existing rules may govern this new situation, and of more concern, (2) the issue of the absence of juridical
means to regulate and control an accident involving an offshore
well spill that is damaging vast areas of international waters and
the coastlines of at least two nations. To approach these objectives, we will examine the viewpoints of Latin American legal
scholars on the direction of the development of the law of the sea
during the post-World War I[ era, especially with regard to Latin
American governments' responses to the 1945 Truman Proclamation on the continental shelf.3 Central to the discussion is the
concept of the "patrimonial sea" attributed to Chilean writer
Edmundo Vargas Carreno and formalized in the Declaration of
Santo Domingo of 1972.4 Often the phrases "regional particularism" or "American international law" refer to the tendency on the
part of many Latin American jurists to cling to Hispanic and natural law traditions in their studies in the international law field.5
The "patrimonial sea" or "mar patrimonial" is an outgrowth of
this school of thought.
Another way to deal with disputes about the presence or ab1. LATin Am. ECON. REP., June 29, 1979, at 197; WoRLD On., Aug. 1, 1979, at 21.
2. The Mexican newspaper Excelsior and news magazine Siempre! accused
Pemex Director Jorge Diaz Serrano of withholding information about the extent of
pollution. An editorial in Siempre! stated that Diaz Serrano should appear before
the Chamber of Deputies to answer questions concerning Ixtoc L See SIEMPREI
(Mexico City), July 28, 1979, at 38, 40.
3. Pres. Proc. No. 2,667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation).
4. See E. VARGAS CARRENO, AMERICA LATINA Y Los PRonLEmAS CoNTEMiPoRANEOUS DEL DERECHO DEL MAR (1973).
5. See Leonhard, Regional Particularisn:The Views of the Latin American

Judges on the InternationalCourt ofJustice, 22 U. Mwmza L. REV. 674 (1968).
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sence of legal precedents to cover the Ixtoc I case, is to offer suggestions for solutions based upon a model such as the system set
up for oil pollution liability resulting from offshore drilling in the
North Sea. As we shall see later, a convention on this problem
has been signed by four states that are presently engaged in exploration and exploitation of mineral resources on the seabed in
that part of Europe. Thus, the purposes of this article are: to address the topic of the Mexican oil spill by setting forth the viewpoints of prominent Latin American jurists on the development of
the emerging concept of the "patrimonial sea" in a critical fashion, and to consider new proposals in the sphere of international
law which could provide answers to the perplexities arising out of
accidents involving the offshore petroleum industry.
REGIONAL PARTICULARISM AND THE

200-MINE ZONE

William E. Butler, Dean of the Faculty of Laws at the University
of Loridon, has initiated a course for post-graduate law students
called "Comparative Approaches to International Legal Systems"
in which part of the time is devoted to analysis of Latin American
contributions to international law. 6 There are definite patterns to

be found in the legal philosophy of Latin American publicists, and
Professor Butler has been joined by a few other scholars from
outside the Hispanic international legal tradition who have -examined the evolution of regional particularism. H. B. Jacobini
states that "virtually all of the writers agree that there exists an
element of continental solidarity which includes a few peculiarly
American rules, practices, and problems, and that America has
contributed much to international law in general."? Most recently, the law of the sea has been at the forefront of regional particularism in the Western Hemisphere. A triumph for the States
that have been pressing since the 1940's for the establishment of a
200-mile exclusive economic zone was the inclusion of a provision
defining such a zone in the Informal Composite Negotiating Text
(ICNT) of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea. 8 However, this victory, for which the Latin Americans have
6. See generally W. BurrLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE COMPARATVE
METHOD (1978).
7. H. JACOBINI, A STUDY OF THE PHILOSoPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS SEEN
IN THE WORKS OF LATIN AMERiCAN WRITERS 154 (1954).
8. U.N. Doe.A/Conf.62/WP.10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ICNTI, reprinted in
16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 1108 (1977).

been working so intensely over the span of nearly four decades, is
at the very heart of the dilemma faced by Mexico and her apologists in connection with the Ixtoc I incident. While Mexican governmental officials are euphoric about the extensive offshore oil
discoveries, the event calls into question the government's liability for pollution originating in the EEZ which damages the environment of a second State.
The Revised Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT/R)
vaguely defines the rights and extent of jurisdiction of the coastal
State in the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. 9 But some type of
responsibility of a State for pollution in its exclusive economic
zone appears in many of the draft articles presented to the United
Nations Seabed Committee.10 Documents drafted in Latin American circles tend to avoid the issue of liability and to expound generalities about the preservation of the marine environment,
pollution control, and conservation. Alberto Szekely's two
volumes entitled Latin America and the Development of the Law
of the Sea are an excellent compilation of national laws and regional documents that bear out the point that regional particularism refrains from facing the liability controversy."
THE DEMISE OF Two MYTHs
The oceans cover nearly three fourths of the surface of the
globe. A common belief before the Torrey Canyon catastrophe in
1967 was that the boundless space of the oceans precludes the
possibility of measurable pollution. Basic to this belief was Grotius' definition of the high seas as mare liberum, not subject to occupation by anyone.12 Under the precept res nullius, the high
seas belonged to no one but was subject to equal use by all.13
Several decades before Grotius wrote the classic, De jure belli ac
4 Victoria and Suarez revived the Roman law concepts jus
pacis,1
gentium and jus naturale to meet the exigencies of colonization
of the New World.15 However, with the world-wide increase of
9. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.10/Rev.1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ICNT/R], reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 686 (1979).
10. Eighteen separate draft articles concerning the prevention of marine pollution in the EEZ are reprinted in 2 S. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE OCEAN

DEVELOPMENT 373-415 (1975).
11. A. SZEKELY, LATIN AMERICA

AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE

SEA, REGIONAL DOCUMENTS AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION (1976).
12. H. GRoTIus, DE JURE HELLI AC PACIS (1625), cited in J. BRIERLY, THE LAw OF
NATIONS 28 (6th ed. 1963).

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. The two Spanish theologians Francisco de Victoria (1480-1546) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) are venerated by Latin American lawyers who frequently
view themselves as contributors to the revival of Spanish Scholasticism. In dis-
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drilling on the continental shelf, the prospect of an uncontrolled

offshore well blowout created fears among environmentalists that
such an occurrence would be even more calamitous than the

worst petroleum supertanker accident. In 1977 Evan Luard
warned: "A single blow-out from an off-shore oil well could pollute vast expanses of ocean, destroy the ecological balance within
a large area and affect several countries."' 6 Ixtoc I seems to fulfill
this dismal prophecy and, along with the Torrey Canyon and
other immense spills resulting from tanker accidents, spells the
end to the myth that the seas are too vast to be susceptible to
man-made pollution.
A utopian theory recently forwarded is the source of a second
myth: the oceans along with their resources constitute "a common heritage of mankind." Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta in a
memo to the United Nations Secretary-General on August 17,
1967, proposed that with the assistance of a Seabed Authority the
revenues accrued from the exploitation of the ocean resources be
used to set up a fund to improve conditions in developing nations.17 But Dennis Pirages points out: "Between Pardo's speech
in 1967 and 1973, however, the 'common heritage' of mankind
shrank from 65 percent of all ocean space to only 35 percent by
means of unilateral declarations by coastal states."' 8
The shortlived dream of a "common heritage of mankind"
stemmed in part from the fact that nations in the Western Hemisphere took direct actions to enforce the 200-mile zone. In keeping with the 1952 Declaration of Santiago on the Maritime Zone,
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, in an effort to protect their fishing
grounds, seized hundreds of United States tuna boats.19 Protests
from the United States were by no means designed to protect the
oceanic commons, but to prevent restrictions on the movement of
cussions of the responsibilities of States, these contemporary theorists make reference to the need to revive or modernize the ideas of their intellectual
forebearers, Victoria and Suarez. See, e.g., Mora, Foundationsof Modern International Law, AMERICAS Nov., 1963, at 1; Alfaro, The Rights and Duties of States, 2
RECUEIL DES COuTS, ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 95-202 (1959).
16. E. LuARD, THE CONTROL OF THE SEA-BED: A NEW INTERNATIONAL IssUE 114

(1977).
17. U.N. Doc. A/6695 at 1-2 (1971).
18. D. PIRAGES, THE NEW CONTEXT

FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

GLOBAL

EcopOLaTics 201 (1978).
19. The label 'Tuna War" was first widely used in Ecuadorian newspapers in

January, 1971. See El Universo (Guayaquil), Jan. 19, 1971, at 6.

naval fleets, merchant ships, and fishing vessels.20 By the 1970's
the fish in the super-adjacent waters and the mineral resources of
the seabed were, in the view of Latin American statesmen and jurists, undisputably within the realm of the exclusive economic
zone, and for them 200 miles became "a universal norm" of inter21
national law.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE "PATRIMONIAL SEA"

Andres Aguilar, Ambassador of Venzuela to the United States,
explains the origins of the phrase "patrimonial sea" in the following way:
The term "patrimonial" in the case, is a natural choice for jurists who
have been trained in the concepts and terminology of European continental law, based on Roman law. For this school the term "patrimonial" immediately brings to mind the idea of a plurality2 of
economic rights vested
2
in a single person, whether natural or juridical.

The derivation of the word "patrimonial" from Roman law is indeed an appropriate choice to describe the zone because, as with
so many Latin words and phrases found in international law, it
conveys clarity of meaning through its very simplicity and logic.
"Patrimony" is defined in Webster's Dictionary as "an estate inherited from one's father or ancestor."23 Analogies made from
Roman domestic law became a basis for establishing rules of international law. Professor Brierly writes that "the founders of international law turned unhesitatingly to Roman law for the rules
of their system wherever the relations between ruling princes
seemed to them to be analogous to those of private persons."24
Equivalents like person-state, contract-treaty, and property-sovereignty were essential to the formation of a body of rules governing nations. In this context the "patrimonial sea" is an oceanic
estate that is the property of a State over which it may exercise
sovereignty lawfully handed down to it by the ancestors or fathers of the State. Furthermore, the development of the technology necessary to exploit ocean resources influenced Latin
American political leaders, diplomats, and international lawyers
20. Hollick, United States Oceans Politics, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV.467 (1973); see
also Loring, The United States Peruvian "Fisheries"Dispute, 23 STAN. L, REV. 391

(1971).
21. Menchaca, El Derecho del mar en el porvenir, 154 RE VISTA DE POL1TICA INTERNACIONAL 53 (1977) (A basis for 200 miles is the extent of the fishing grounds of
the Humboldt Current).
22. Aguilar, The PatrimonialSea, in THE LAw OF THE SEA, NEEDS AND INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE LAw OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, 161-62 (L Alexander ed. 1973).
23. WEBsTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 840 (G&C Merriam Co., ed. 1975).
24. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 20 (6th ed. 1963).
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to press for the creation of an area to be termed the patrimonial
sea, epicontinental sea, or exclusive economic zone.

Throughout the history of Latin America since the period of independence from Spain, most States in the region have been subjected to domination and intervention from Europe and the

United States. Thus, legal documents and proclamations became
the major tool for weak nations to counter the pressures of power

politics. The legalistic mentality prevalent among Hispanic-American governmental officials is misunderstood and criticized by

lawyers trained in the "common law" tradition. Latin American
foreign policies reflect intense feelings of anti-imperialism, selfdetermination, xenophobia, and patriotism. 25 The permeation of
legalism into Latin American culture is typified in the reference
to Argentina as "the land of abrogados (lawyers). "26
Several terms were presented to describe the region's push for
the 200-mile zone; but as mentioned earlier the phrase "patrimonial sea" was first used by Professor Edmundo Vargas Carrefio in
1971 in the following manner.
The patrimonial sea includes both the territorial sea as well as a zone be-

yond it the extension of which is determined unilaterally-but not arbitrarily-by the coastal State. The jurisdiction of the coastal State to
regulate the exploration, conservation, and exploitation of the marine resources contained within the patrimonial sea
27 is extended over the adjacent waters, the seabed and subsoil thereof.

The Declaration of Santo Domingo 1972 reaffirmed the concept,
thereby laying the ground for a firm regional consensus to submit
the idea of the zone for recognition at the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea Sessions in Caracas 1974 and in
New York 1977. Indeed, it took an aggressive small group of delegates to argue in behalf of poor nations and developing nations to
win support for the 200-mile zone as a natural heritage to be utilized for the economic development of the Third World.28 In reality, Mexico is one of the few more developed nations in this group
which will reap the benefits allowed by the new draft provisions
on the exclusive economic zone in the ICNT/R.29 Mexican For25. These policies have in turn been translated into declarations such as the
Drago and Calvo doctrines. See id. at 228, 324.
26. A. WHrrAKER, ARGENTINA 59-60 (1964).
27. Cited in Amador, The Latin American Contributionto the Development of
the Law of the Sea, 68 AM. J. INT'L L 33, 43 (1974).

28. Stewart, Mexico's Oil: Myth, Fact and Future,WoRLu OL July, 1979, at 21.

29. See Franck, An InternationalRegime for the Seabed Beyond National Ju-

risdiction,6 GA. J. INT'L &COMP. L 151, 155 (1976).

eign Minister Jorge Castaneda announced in June 1979 that the
oil policy of his country would continue to be geared to the utilization of petroleum revenues for national economic develop30
ment.
Lex Ferenda or Lex Lata
Perhaps the most important cause of confusion about the status
of the patrimonial sea is the matter of whether the concept is lex
ferenda (law which it is desired to establish) or lex lata (law in
force). It appears that from statements and declarations issued,
as well as from actions taken to police the 200-mile zone, Latin
American States consider the new international law of the sea to
have assimilated the patrimonial sea as lex lata. Again, we find
ourselves caught up in the debate over regional particularism.
Professor W. E. Butler explains:
For all its undoubted virtues and weaknesses, international law operates
as a system in which the subjects of the system have profoundly diverse
histories, languages, cultures, ideologies, values, levels of socio-economic
and political development, and legal traditions. Some international legal
rules are universal, or nearly so, in their acceptance, whereas others are
applied within geographic regions or clusters of ideological or political affinities. 3 1

The "patrimonialists" should be greatly encouraged by the inclusion of the "exclusive economic zone" in the ICNT/R and the
recent Canadian seizures of United States tuna boats. Are these
happenings evidence of international acceptance of the new zone?
The fact that acceptance of the EEZ is growing so rapidly leads
Professor Szekely to conclude that while "much controversy remains as to the detailed jurisdiction that it embraces .. . , the
zone is now viable and will become a proposition de lege lata."32
Other publicists concur with the conclusion that the EEZ or patrimonial sea is well on its way to the status of lex lata.
In
summary, it
would be useful to cite Georg
Schwarzenberger's lucid and concise description of the concept:
In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State is to be granted "sovereign rights" regarding the conservation and exploitation of the actual resources of the sea-bed and subsoil and superadjacent waters, and
exclusive jurisdiction regarding the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, other activities for the economic exploitation of the zone, and pollution control .... Other States are limited
in the exclusive zone to rights of navigation, overflight and communication, but subject to control by the coastal State in safety zones around artificial islands, installations and structures. Like land-locked States in the
region, other States may participate in the exploitation of the living re30. Excelsior (Mexico City), June 6, 1979, at 1.
31. W. BuT_.R, supra note 6, at 115.
32. A. SzEKELY, supra note 11, at 171-72.
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sources of the zone only under agreements with the coastal State.

33

THE QUESTION OF LIABILIYY FOR OIL SPILS FROM OFFSHORE
DRILLING OPERATIONS

With the possible exception of the Santa Barbara "Oil Disaster
of 1969" during which 1,000 gallons of crude per hour poured into
the Pacific over a period of 11 days,34 spills from offshore drilling
35
in the Western Hemisphere have not received much publicity.
However, the Ixtoc I blowout is causing great alarm among observers inside and outside the petroleum industry. Technicians
working to bring the spill under control and authorities connected
with the cleanup operations have expressed dismay over the magnitude of the accident. 36 The massive spill is a crucial dividing

point in the history of the evolution of laws governing the offshore
37
oil industry as it enters a new era.
The time has arrived when the international community cannot

afford to allow coastal States to set standards unilaterally for pollution resulting from drilling operations in the EEZ which dam-

age the marine environment of large expanses of the ocean as
well as the ecological balance in the waters under the jurisdiction
of several States. Enforcement of international laws aimed at
protecting the marine environment will not be an easy task for

the United Nations or regional agencies, but one might offer some
suggestions about the creation of models for dealing with this

problem.
Plans for abating offshore drilling-source pollution are at an em-

bryonic stage, but do show promise because of the serious commitment by some States and petroleum companies to meet the

problem head-on before the advent of widespread and irreversible
33. Georg Schwarzenberger warns:
The area enclosed in exclusive economic zones of Coastal States covers
more than one-third of the total area of the high seas, and 10 countries
would receive 30 per cent of the area appropriated. Combined with the
rules on international straits proposed in the Convention, it is estimated
that on a consensual basis, four-fifths of world fishing and nearly all exploitable off-shore oil would come under the control of Coastal States.
Schwarzenberger, Trends in the Law of the Sea; From Leviathan to Jaws? in THE
YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 1979 at 365, 366 (G. Schwarzenberger ed. 1979).
34. B. BuzAN, SEABED POLrIcs 126 (1976).
35. One can only speculate about the long-term damage resulting from unreported spills which accompany the day-to-day production of oil from offshore rigs.
36. LATIN Am. ECON. REP., June 29, 1979, at 197.
37. See generally P. SWAN, THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF OCEAN Om (1979).

damage to the oceans. On the matter of liability the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) and the
Stockholm Declaration have provided a number of principles that
were later incorporated into the ICNT/R.
Perhaps, the most promising model convention is the Convention on Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore
Operations which establishes civil liability for oil pollution in the
North Sea. David B. Keto explains:
Thus far, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
have signed it. In order for the convention to come into force, it must be
ratified by four countries, and implementing legislation must be drafted
The Convention provides for the strict liabilby each of the parties ....
ity of offshore operators for damage caused by oil released in the course of
offshore operations. Parties to the Convention may set maximum levels of
liability but the maximum may be no less than $35 million, rising to $145
million in May of 1982. Claims for damages may be brought in the courts

of the state in which
3 8 the pollution originated or of the state in which the
damages occurred.

Legislation concerning the creation of a "superfund" at the federal level to cover compensation for damage caused by offshore
operations has been under consideration in Congress. The
"superfund" would resemble the North Sea liability pool. Keto
argues that "unlimited civil liability is precisely the sort of legal
uncertainty that the oil companies appear to view as the most
threatening to the viability of their operations."3 9 Thus, we can
expect that the pragmatic approach to the issue of liability in the
form of model domestic laws, such as the "superfund," will precede any enforceable rules originating from regional arrangements.
CONCLUSION
If the Ixtoc I incident is to give momentum to the creation of
new domestic, regional, and international laws aimed at the prevention of offshore oil disasters, advocates of these rules will have
to overcome several obstacles: (1) the "energy crunch" is likely
to lead to a laissezfairepolicy toward national and multinational
petroleum enterprises; (2) leaders in the Third World countries,
in keeping with the much heralded "New Economic Order," have
hastened the pace for the exploitation of seabed resources; (3) economic development through offshore oil production in the patrimonial sea has become a matter of intense national pride; 40 (4) a
long history of Latin American hostility and distrust toward the
38. See generally D. KETO, LAw AND OFFSHORE OIL DEVELOPMENr. THE NORTH

SEA EXPERIENCE (1978).
39. Id. at 100.
40. E.g., Mexico's oil policies.
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United States will probably rule out legally binding regional arrangements on liability for oil spills; (5) the technology of offshore
drilling used in many States may be inferior to those found in areas which have been operating for several decades; and (6) optimism and enthusiasm about the discovery of new seabed reserves
has resulted in the willingness of some States to become "pollution havens" at the expense of the ocean environment. Finally,
the above conclusions are epitomized by the reaction of Jorge
Diaz Serrano (Director General of Pemex) who, during the worst
stages of the Ixtoc I disaster, stated that the rate of 30,000 barrels
per day of crude flowing into the Gulf of Mexico from the blowout
well was proof that his nation might have greater petroleum
reserves than earlier estimated.4 1

41. See LATIN Am. EcoN. REP., June 29, 1979, at 197.

